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SHINING THE LIGHT A LITTLE BRIGHTER:  
SHOULD ITEM 303 SERVE AS A BASIS FOR 
LIABILITY UNDER RULE 10b-5? 
Lauren M. Mastronardi* 
 
This Note discusses a securities disclosure issue stemming from a split 
between the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit.  The question presented 
is whether failure to comply with a disclosure requirement created by Item 
303 of Regulation S-K can provide a basis for liability under section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.  The Ninth Circuit 
held that such violation does not provide a basis for liability.  Conversely, 
in Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, the Second Circuit explicitly 
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and concluded that this violation may 
serve as a basis for liability.  This Note examines the rationales behind 
each decision, as well as the rationales behind disclosure regulations more 
generally, and ultimately concludes that Item 303 violations should serve as 
a basis for 10b-5 liability, as long as all of the remaining requirements of a 
10b-5 claim are met. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Information is one of the most valuable tools in society.  Not only does it 
foster intelligent communication and knowledgeable decision making, it 
also reduces the risk of inefficiency and waste.  Information can, however, 
also be overwhelming and burdensome.1  In a time when information is 
more accessible than ever, it is vital to focus attention on that information 
which is most useful.  This becomes especially important when evaluating 
securities regulation. 
From the beginning, securities regulation has been focused on 
disclosure.2  While issuers were often willing to disclose information that 
would attract investors, many felt that regulation was needed to ensure that 
these investors were not being deceived or misled.3  Over time, Congress 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have developed and 
modified many different regulations in an attempt to ensure a fair and 
efficient securities markets.4  One such regulation is Item 303 of Regulation 
S-K (“Item 303”).5  The SEC has long viewed Item 303 as an important and 
 
 1. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, The Path Forward on Disclosure, Speech at the 
National Association of Corporate Directors—Leadership Conference 2013 (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539878806 (noting concern about the 
possibility that current disclosure obligations can lead to an “information overload”) 
[https://perma.cc/ND3P-YBCP]. 
 2. See infra Part I.A. 
 3. See infra Part I.A. 
 4. See infra Part I.A. 
 5. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2016). 
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unique opportunity for investors to get a glimpse of the company “through 
the eyes of management.”6 
While rules and regulations are important, they are arguably ineffective 
without an appropriate enforcement mechanism.7  Thus, a court’s decision 
that a particular violation may or may not serve as a basis for liability will 
have a significant impact on securities regulation and, consequently, the 
market as a whole.  A recent split between the Second Circuit and the Ninth 
Circuit provides a vivid example of the implications of a court’s decision in 
the securities realm.8  This split concerns whether a violation of Item 303 
may serve as a basis for liability under section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 19349 and SEC Rule 10b-5.10 
Deciding whether a violation of Item 303 is actionable under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 will have a great impact on a variety of players in the 
securities markets.11  For example, the risk of liability will encourage 
issuers to disclose thorough and adequate details concerning how “trends or 
uncertainties could harm the issuer’s financial condition.”12  In making this 
decision, however, it also is important to consider what safeguards are in 
place to protect against a flood of information and (unnecessary) 
litigation.13 
Part I of this Note briefly discusses the development of securities 
regulation and the specific regulations pertinent to this analysis.  It also 
analyzes the extent to which disclosure obligations achieve the goals 
underlying their creation and how they have evolved to meet new issues.  In 
 
 6. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of 
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 
Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,428 (May 24, 1989) [hereinafter 
1989 SEC Release] (quoting Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition 
and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, Exchange Act Release No. 24,356, 52 Fed. 
Reg. 13,715, 13,717 (Apr. 24, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 SEC Release]). 
 7. However, critics of mandatory disclosure argue that voluntary disclosure, regulated 
by market forces, is a much more efficient way of ensuring an optimal level of disclosure. 
See Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming to an End:  The 
Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 689–91 (1999). 
 8. See generally Jonathan C. Dickey & Noah F. Stern, Creating a Clear Circuit Split, 
the Second Circuit Holds That Failure to Disclose Known Trends or Uncertainties Under 
Item 303 of Regulation S-K Creates Liability Under Section 10(b), GIBSON, DUNN & 
CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/ 
Second-Circuit--Failure-to-Disclose-Known-Trends-or-Uncertainties-Under-Item-303--
Regulation%20S-K-Creates-Liability.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L6G-EZSQ]. 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). 
 10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see infra Part II.  Although recent literature has addressed 
this issue, this Note will expand upon the issues and provide a unique perspective on 
rationales that underlie this Note’s proposed resolution. See generally Denise Voigt 
Crawford & Dean Galaro, A Rule 10b-5 Private Right of Action for MD&A Violations?, 43 
SEC. REG. L.J. 1 (2015). 
 11. See infra Part III.E. 
 12. See Dickey & Stern, supra note 8, at 4. 
 13. See Susanna M. Buergel, Andrew J. Ehrlich & Audra J. Soloway, Keeping Current:  
Second Circuit Holds That Omissions Regarding “Known Trends” May Support a Section 
10(b) Claim, but Imposes Limitations, BUS. L. TODAY 2 (Feb. 2015), http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2015/02/full-issue-201502.authcheckdam. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/KES7-LHPJ]. 
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addition, it explores the debate concerning whether mandatory disclosure is 
the best way to regulate securities.14  While most agree that accurate 
information is crucial to the decision-making process, there is some dispute 
as to whether mandatory disclosure is the best way to provide investors 
with the optimal amount.  Finally, it discusses a few of the regulations that 
play an important role in the circuit split discussed in Part II. 
Part II then examines a recent conflict that has arisen among circuit 
courts.  Specifically, this part discusses whether a failure to comply with a 
disclosure requirement created by Item 303 provides a basis for liability 
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  The two circuits to squarely address 
this issue have reached opposite conclusions.  This part details the 
rationales offered by each decision, as well as how the courts have applied 
those rationales to the facts of each case. 
Part III of this Note explains why the U.S. Supreme Court should endorse 
the Second Circuit’s conclusion in Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley15 
that a violation of Item 303 may serve as a basis for liability under Rule 
10b-5.  First, it examines the materiality requirements of Item 303 and Rule 
10b-5, independent of the two main cases.  Next, it discusses why the 
Second Circuit appropriately interpreted and applied the relevant precedent.  
Finally, it explores the impact that such liability will have on the various 
players of the securities markets, including the companies that produce the 
information and the investors who rely on it. 
I.  SECURITIES REGULATION:  
DEVELOPMENT, DISCLOSURE, AND DECREES 
This Note begins by discussing the evolution of the securities regime 
implemented in the United States.  Part I.A explores the evolution of 
mandatory disclosures and securities regulations more generally.  Next, Part 
I.B briefly discusses some of the key arguments made in the debate 
surrounding the use of disclosure obligations.  Finally, Part I.C takes a 
closer look at several regulations examined by the Ninth Circuit and the 
Second Circuit in resolving the conflict described in Part II. 
A.  Emergence of Disclosure Regulations 
Beginning in the 1930s, the federal government decided to use disclosure 
as the primary means of regulating the securities markets.  Over time, 
although the specifics of various regulations have changed, the basic 
concept of using mandatory disclosure has remained the touchstone of this 
regime.  This section will examine the development of securities law and 
the policies behind its implementation. 
 
 14. This includes whether, or to what extent, disclosure obligations protect investors and 
promote an efficient market. 
 15. 776 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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1.  1934–1960s:  Creation and Implementation 
The stock market crash of October 1929 and the ensuing depression 
prompted calls for reform from the government and society as a whole.16  
The years leading up to this crash were filled with “general prosperity,” 
which motivated the first wave of “relatively unsophisticated small scale 
investors” to enter the stock market.17  After the crash, Congress 
determined that abuses in the securities markets, such as fraud and 
deliberate manipulation of stock prices, were partially to blame.18  Thus, 
one of Congress’s main priorities was to find a way to protect vulnerable 
investors.19 
Concluding that both state regulation and self-regulation were 
ineffective, legislators began to direct their attention toward reform.20  
Although many wanted a system based on government oversight, President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt promoted a system based on disclosure.21  Not 
only did disclosure impede illegal activity, but it “also tended to discourage 
conduct which, although technically legal, was not entirely consistent with 
the highest fiduciary standards of behavior.”22  In addition, this form of 
regulation required limited government intervention.23 
These ideas were articulated in Congress’s enactment of the Securities 
Act of 1933 (“the 1933 Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(“the 1934 Act”).  The 1933 Act established requirements pertaining to the 
issuance of new securities.24  Barring a specific exemption, a new security 
could be offered for sale only after the offeror filed a registration statement 
with the SEC and such statement became effective.25  The SEC, however, 
had no authority to evaluate the quality of the underlying securities.26  If the 
registration statement contained the required information, and this 
information was not inadequate or misleading, it became effective at the 
end of the twenty-day waiting period.27  After the registration statement 
 
 16. Alison G. Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation:  A 
Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 316–17 (1974). 
 17. Id. at 316. 
 18. See id. at 316–17. 
 19. See id. (noting that many small investors had been financially harmed by their 
investments). 
 20. See id. at 318. 
 21. See George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market:  An Evaluation 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 132 (1973). 
 22. Anderson, supra note 16, at 319. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. at 321. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. at 322.  In fact, the 1933 Act made it a crime for the SEC to comment on the 
merits or truthfulness of a registration statement or offered security. See id. at 322 n.50. 
 27. See id. at 322.  Although the statute listed specific requirements, it also gave the SEC 
broad discretion to vary these requirements. Id. 
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became effective, the registrant could begin to sell securities, but was 
required to send a detailed prospectus28 to all purchasers.29 
The 1933 Act also was designed to regulate transactions within the 
securities markets.30  In addition to providing explicit prohibitions on 
certain actions, the 1933 Act created private remedies for individuals who 
bought securities from sellers who failed to provide proper disclosure or 
used deceptive statements.31  Legislators hoped that these rules 
simultaneously would increase the amount of accurate and useful 
information in the marketplace and protect against fraud.32 
The 1934 Act was intended to extend the regulations of the 1933 Act to 
existing securities.33  Issuers of preexisting securities were required to 
register these securities with the SEC and, in addition, file periodic reports 
to ensure the information remained current.34  Although issuers were not 
required to send these periodic reports directly to investors, proponents of a 
mandatory disclosure system believed that small investors would still 
benefit from such disclosure.35  Despite recognizing that average investors 
would not be able to effectively utilize the detailed information in these 
disclosures, proponents believed that investors would benefit from the 
advice given and decisions made by those who could use the information 
effectively.36 
It was immediately apparent, however, that these statutes were not well 
suited to protect small investors.37  Despite Congress’s hope, these 
regulations were better equipped to disseminate information than to protect 
unsophisticated investors.38  Although these regulations increased the 
accessibility of reliable information, this information was not ideal for 
efficient investment analysis.39  Those who wished to comply often were 
stymied by “uncertain rules and ad hoc pronouncements,” which resulted in 
unhelpful “boilerplate” disclosures.40  In addition, issuers often 
 
 28. Id.  As articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court, the term “prospectus” describes 
“documents related to public offerings by an issuer or its controlling shareholders.” 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995). 
 29. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 322.  This prospectus was to contain all of the 
information that was in the registration statement. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id.; see also William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 
1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 171–72 (1933) (noting that a “slow educational process” must take 
place before the novice investors can benefit from these disclosures). 
 32. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 323. 
 33. Id. at 327. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 328–30. 
 36. See id. at 329–30.  It was believed that this effective use of information would result 
in more accurate market prices. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. at 321. 
 39. See id. at 342; see also Homer Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 BUS. 
LAW. 631, 632 (1973) (arguing that some disclosures were too sophisticated for the layman, 
yet too elementary to be useful for experts). 
 40. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 342. 
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promulgated unnecessarily pessimistic disclosures, with the hope of 
protecting against the unrealistic expectations advertised by promoters.41 
2.  1964:  Expansion 
In 1964, the reach of the 1934 Act was expanded to cover the over-the-
counter market.42  This greatly enhanced the SEC’s ability to protect 
investors in the arena where most securities transactions took place:  the 
trading markets.43  Before this expansion, the SEC’s ability to enact strict 
disclosure regulations was limited by the ability of companies to avoid 
compliance by simply delisting.44 
Although many government officials still advocated for protecting the 
novice investor from fraud, focus began to shift toward making required 
disclosure more useful for sophisticated investment analysis.45  As the 
securities markets became increasingly complicated, the demand for 
professional analysts and financial managers increased.46  At the same time, 
the demand for more sophisticated information also increased.47  One way 
the SEC accommodated the latter demand was to relax some of the 
“stringent requirements that disclosure be negative in tone and limited to 
‘hard facts.’”48 
The goal of protecting the small investor, however, was not totally 
abandoned.  Issuers consistently were urged to make changes to their 
prospectuses, such as reducing length and complexity, to make them more 
palatable to unsophisticated traders.49  In addition, issuers were required to 
put summaries in each prospectus to help protect investors from making bad 
investments.50  While simplifying these disclosures may have benefited 
novice investors, it also may have made these disclosures less useful to 
experts.51 
3.  1982:  Integration 
For over forty years, the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act were administered 
independently, which resulted in duplicative obligations that were required 
 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. at 343; see also Milton H. Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. 
REV. 1340, 1341 (1966) (discussing how the 1964 amendments made the disclosure 
requirements of the 1934 Act “applicable to a much larger category of issuers”). 
 43. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 343. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 343–44. 
 46. See id. at 343. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. “Hard Facts” are the opposite of “soft information.” Id. at 337–38.  “Soft 
information” constitutes information that is not “susceptible [to] objective verification,” such 
as statements about the future. Id. at 337 n.126 (citing Carl W. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and 
Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1972)). 
 49. See id. at 351. 
 50. See id. at 351–52. 
 51. See Kripke, supra note 39, at 632. 
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to be satisfied in different ways.52  Thus, during the 1970s, the SEC began 
focusing its attention on developing an integrated system that would reduce 
redundancy and foster consistency.53 
Regulation S-K was implemented as part of this integrated disclosure 
system and contains many “substantive disclosure requirements,” including 
Item 303.54  Specifically, Regulation S-K contains the requirements for the 
nonfinancial disclosures contained in documents filed with the SEC.55  
While the amount of detail required by Regulation S-K may seem 
overwhelming, it is qualified by the concept of materiality.56 
4.  Recent Regulations:  
Highlighting a Recurring Pattern 
Throughout history, financial crises have been catalysts for significant 
reforms.57  One such reform is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200258 
(“Sarbanes-Oxley”), which was enacted in response to major scandals, such 
as those involving Enron and WorldCom.59  Congress hoped that this 
legislation would “restore investor confidence by improving corporate 
financial reporting.”60  Congress’s approach, however, was unique in that 
the focus was not disclosure obligations but, rather, substantive 
regulations.61 
Soon after Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley, however, the U.S. 
economy experienced the most devastating crisis since the Great 
Depression.62  To protect against another such depression, Congress 
enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
 
 52. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure:  The Coming Debate 
over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143, 1158 (1995). 
 53. See id. 
 54. See STAFF OF THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS IN REGULATION S-K 8–10 (Dec. 2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
2013/reg-sk-disclosure-requirements-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU5C-CDEK]. 
 55. Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform—The SEC Is Riding Off in Two Directions at 
Once 4 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 419, 2015), http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2650719&download=yes [https://perma.cc/6C 
R5-2R8J]. 
 56. See id. at 4–5.  Materiality plays an important role in the circuit split that is the focus 
of this Note and is discussed in further detail below. 
 57. See id. at 6. 
 58. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
 59. See Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26 YALE J. ON 
REG. 229, 235 (2009); Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act:  A Primer and a Critique, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 831, 831 (2007). 
 60. Beverley H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection 
Under Sarbanes-Oxley:  A Proposal for Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 4 (2007) (quoting JOHN 
BOSTLEMAN, Background:  Twelve Months Leading Up to the SOA, in THE SARBANES-
OXLEY DESKBOOK 2–32 (2004)).  Another major goal of Sarbanes-Oxley, the protection of 
whistleblowers, see id., is not discussed in this Note. 
 61. See Romano, supra note 59, at 232 (noting that only a limited number of provisions 
in Sarbanes-Oxley contained disclosure requirements). 
 62. See Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON 
REG. 91, 92 (2012). 
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Act63 (“Dodd-Frank”).  Dodd-Frank changed the way institutions were 
supervised by considering the functions of each institution rather than the 
specified corporate form.64  In addition, Dodd-Frank instituted new 
agencies to collect data and ensure transparency throughout financial 
markets.65  However, before the SEC was able to execute fully the 
expansive regulations required under Dodd-Frank, Congress passed the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act66 (“JOBS Act”).  Unlike Sarbanes-
Oxley and Dodd-Frank, the JOBS Act reduced the number of requirements 
imposed on certain companies.67 
This brief, partial history is meant to illustrate a pattern of “episodic 
expansion of regulatory scope within the disclosure regime.”68  The next 
section of this Note explores a debate that often accompanies these reforms. 
B.  Why Disclose at All? 
Even though disclosure remains the focus of securities regulation, the 
debate surrounding its use is still thriving.  Not only are there questions 
about mandatory disclosure generally, but there are also disputes about 
what level of disclosure is most efficient.69  This section briefly highlights 
some of the arguments on both sides of this contentious debate. 
As previously discussed, disclosure rules were implemented with a 
variety of policy goals in mind.70  A few of the main justifications for such 
rules are encouraging confidence in the markets, protecting unsophisticated 
investors, and ensuring investors receive adequate and accurate 
information.71  By increasing the supply of accurate information, mandatory 
disclosure promotes efficiency and profitability throughout the securities 
markets.72 
Since information has many qualities of a public good,73 it tends to be 
underprovided and not adequately verified.74  Thus, it is argued that 
mandatory disclosure is needed to prevent companies from trying to avoid 
 
 63. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 64. See Barr, supra note 62, at 92. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). 
 67. Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Peter I. Tsoflias, An Introduction to the Federalist 
Society’s Panelist Discussion Titled “Deregulating the Markets:  The JOBS Act,” 38 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 453, 454 (2013). 
 68. Romano, supra note 59, at 231. 
 69. See White, supra note 1. 
 70. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 71. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection 
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 692–96 (1984).  Easterbrook and Fischel find these 
rationales unconvincing and present alternative justifications, including protecting against 
interstate exploitation and limiting the costs of a common law system. See id. at 696–99. 
 72. See id. at 673. 
 73. A public good is a good from which others can consume and benefit, whether or not 
they contributed to the costs of acquiring it. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the 
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 725 (1984). 
 74. See id. at 722. 
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liability by simply staying silent.75  Mandatory disclosure also reduces the 
fear that rivals will get a “free ride” or a “competitive advantage” from such 
disclosure.76  In addition, since those who spend the time and resources to 
thoroughly evaluate a potential investment tend to be undercompensated, a 
regulatory response may be justified to correct the market’s failure to 
produce the “socially optimal supply of research.”77 
Those in favor of mandatory disclosure also argue that fostering 
collectivization helps minimize social waste caused by investors 
misallocating resources in pursuit of trading gains.78  This collectivization 
also helps preserve resources by protecting against unnecessary 
duplication.79  Rather than duplicating research, these resources could be 
used in other ways, such as expanding investment.80 
There is, however, some debate over whether mandatory disclosure rules 
are necessary to facilitate the spread of information.81  One argument is that 
the best disclosure policy is the one utilized by corporations in the absence 
of regulations.82  If disclosure will assist investors, then the company will 
do so because it will lead to increased profits.83 
There also are arguments that mandatory disclosure is not necessary to 
combat the free rider problem discussed above.84  Although others benefit 
from the efforts put forth by informed traders,85 these efforts do not go 
unrewarded.  There are benefits, such as discounts on accurate valuations, 
available to those who first acquire information.86 
In addition, there are concerns that too many disclosure requirements 
might actually hurt the market by forfeiting quality for quantity.87  As the 
amount of detail required to satisfy disclosure obligations increases, 
investors may be so inundated with information that they are unable to 
accurately ascertain what information is relevant.88 
 
 75. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 680. 
 76. See id. at 686. 
 77. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 73, at 725–28. 
 78. See id. at 722. 
 79. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 682. 
 80. See id. at 675. 
 81. See id. at 680–85. 
 82. See Benston, supra note 21, at 133.  One rebuttal to this, however, is that it “assumes 
much too facilely that manager and shareholder interests can be perfectly aligned.” Coffee, 
Jr., supra note 73, at 722. 
 83. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 71, at 682. 
 84. See id. at 694. 
 85. These efforts will be reflected in the market prices, which fluctuate until they 
adequately represent the information known at that time. See id. 
 86. See id.  Becuase mandatory disclosure will still not provide the passive investors 
with the information in time to benefit from these bargains, it is argued that another rationale 
is needed to promote this policy. See id. 
 87. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988). 
 88. See White, supra note 1. 
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C.  Relevant Rules and Regulations 
This part examines several rules and regulations that play a significant 
role in the conflict discussed in Part II.  Part I.C.1 discusses section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5.  It also examines the different components of claims 
brought under Rule 10b-5, focusing particularly on materiality.  Part I.C.2 
briefly discusses sections 11 and 12(a)(2), which are pertinent to the 
analysis of the circuit split discussed in Part II.  Finally, Part I.C.3 analyzes 
Item 303.  Specifically, it examines the textual requirements, as well as 
SEC guidance on how to meet those requirements. 
1.  Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
Under section 10(b), it is illegal “[t]o use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
SEC may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for 
the protection of investors.”89  As noted by the Supreme Court, this section 
was intended to be a comprehensive provision that protected against a 
variety of deceptive practices, including fraud.90  This section also endows 
the SEC with the power to prohibit such conduct in securities 
transactions.91 
Consequently, the SEC implemented section 10(b) via Rule 10b-5, which 
states that 
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) [t]o employ any 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement 
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.92 
In order to bring a successful Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must establish 
six elements:  “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the 
defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or 
omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the 
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”93 
While explicit misstatements are relatively easy to identify, it is more 
difficult to determine whether a company’s silence may expose it to 
liability.  The Supreme Court shed some light on this issue by declaring that 
 
 89. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). 
 90. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203–04 (1976). 
 91. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952). 
 92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016). 
 93. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).  
This Note focuses on the first element, while briefly discussing the other five. 
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“[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”94  
It did not, however, explicitly describe what was required to create a duty to 
disclose.95  Although neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 creates an 
affirmative obligation to disclose all material information, disclosure is 
required when “a material fact [is] necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading.”96 
A key term in the first element of a Rule 10b-5 claim is “materiality.”97  
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson,98 the Supreme Court clarified the materiality 
standard for Rule 10b-5 by explicitly stating that “an omitted fact is 
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder 
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”99  Basic also clarified 
that, if information is speculative or contingent, materiality depends on 
“both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated 
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.”100 
The Supreme Court, however, also warned against treating investors like 
children who are unable to comprehend the probable consequences of 
typical business interactions.101  It was concerned that if companies started 
overdisclosing to protect against liability, the rule would end up harming 
the very investors it was designed to protect.102  Thus, to prevent the rule 
from generating too great of an influx of information, the Supreme Court 
explicitly stated that it was “careful not to set too low a standard of 
materiality.”103 
The other contours of the remaining five elements similarly have been 
defined through jurisprudence.  For example, the scienter requirement of 
Rule 10b-5 has been read by most courts to require that the defendant 
knowingly or recklessly disseminated a disclosure that was false or 
misleading.104  The dominant approach to analyzing recklessness is to apply 
a subjective standard.105  The Supreme Court also confirmed that to bring a 
private action under Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs must have actually bought or 
 
 94. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988). 
 95. See In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 97. See id. 
 98. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 99. Id. at 231.  This language was taken from another Supreme Court case that arose 
under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14a-9. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 100. Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 
(2d Cir. 1968)). 
 101. See id. at 234. 
 102. See id. at 231. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions:  A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. 
L. REV. 101, 126 (1997). 
 105. See id. at 126 n.83 (“There must be some awareness of the risk that the disclosure is 
false or misleading, not simply an extreme departure from the standard of care.”). 
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sold securities.106  With regard to reliance, the Supreme Court has applied 
the fraud-on-the-market theory.107  This theory is based on the assumption 
that investors who purchase securities rely on the integrity of market prices, 
which reflect most publicly available information.108  Thus, in a Rule 10b-5 
action, it may be presumed that these investors relied on public disclosures 
that contained material misrepresentations or omissions.109  Finally, to 
bring a successful action under Rule 10b-5, plaintiffs must also establish 
“that the defendant’s deceptive conduct caused their claimed economic 
loss.”110 
Although Rule 10b-5 does not expressly provide for a private right of 
action, courts have crafted an implied right of recovery for individual 
investors.111  Damages in these cases mostly have consisted of actual 
damages, rescission, and injunctive relief.112 
2.  Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act 
In analyzing the connection between Item 303 and Rule 10b-5, the Ninth 
Circuit and the Second Circuit disagree over whether it is appropriate to 
consider the relationship between Item 303 and sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of 
the 1933 Act.113 
Although sections 11 and 12(a)(2) establish bases for liability in 
connection with the purchase of securities, each rule is limited in scope to 
specific types of transactions.114  While section 11 applies to sales of 
securities in connection with public offerings, section 12(a)(2) covers 
transactions made via instruments of interstate commerce.115  Although the 
requirements for claims brought under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) are not 
identical to those brought under Rule 10b-5, there is some overlap—the 
most significant being the focus on materiality.116 
Both section 11 and section 12(a)(2) state that disclosure of untrue 
material statements constitutes a basis for liability.117  In addition, both 
sections impose liability for omissions of material facts necessary to 
prevent disclosed statements from becoming misleading.118  Not only is the 
language similar to that of Rule 10b-5, but courts also have applied the 
 
 106. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (noting 
desire to prevent “vexatious litigation” as one of its rationales). 
 107. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 229. 
 108. See id. at 245. 
 109. See id. at 246–47. 
 110. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 807 (2011). 
 111. See Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Remedies Under Rule 10b-5, 45 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 733, 
735 (1971).  The first decision to find an implied right of action was Kardon v. Nat’l 
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
 112. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2012); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 
787, 803 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 113. See infra Part II. 
 114. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2). 
 115. See id. 
 116. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 117. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2). 
 118. See id. 
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same standard for materiality in all three causes of action.119  However, a 
defendant will not be liable if it can prove that the purchaser was aware of 
the material untruth or omission.120. 
Unlike Rule 10b-5, these rules explicitly establish private rights of 
action.121  However, both provisions are limited in scope and impose 
stringent liability standards.122  In addition, plaintiffs alleging violations 
under either section 11 or 12(a)(2) do not have to prove scienter, reliance, 
or causation of damages.123 
3.  Item 303:  Management’s Discussion and Analysis 
of Financial Condition and Results of Operations 
Item 303 states that the registrant will “[d]escribe any known trends or 
uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will 
have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or 
income from continuing operations.”124  Instruction 3 to this paragraph 
states that “[t]he discussion and analysis shall focus specifically on material 
events and uncertainties known to management that would cause reported 
financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating 
results or of future financial condition.”125  This disclosure is called 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A). 
The SEC later clarified that there is an affirmative duty to disclose when 
“a trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is both presently 
known to management and reasonably likely to have material effects on the 
registrant’s financial condition or results of operation.”126  In these 
situations, companies should, and may even be obligated to, provide more 
than just a simple a discussion.  Instead, companies should provide a 
detailed analysis of the pertinent information.127  However, the SEC has 
cautioned that this obligation requires “quantitative information” only when 
it is “reasonably available and will provide material information for 
investors.”128 
 
 119. See Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 717 n.10 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing 
Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 178 n.11 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 120. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2). 
 121. See id. 
 122. Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(noting that these sections “impose[] strict liability on issuers and signatories, and negligence 
liability on underwriters”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2016). 
 125. Id. § 229.303(a), Instruction 3. 
 126. 1989 SEC Release, supra note 6, at 22,429. 
 127. See Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Results of Operation, Securities Act Release No. 8350, Exchange 
Act Release No. 48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056, 75,056 (Dec. 29, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 SEC 
Release]. 
 128. Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 105 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting 2003 
SEC Release, supra note 127, at 75,065). 
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The SEC also clarified that the test for materiality under Item 303 
requires a two-step process.129  First, if management decides that the 
“known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty”130 is not 
“reasonably likely to occur,” then they need not disclose.131  The key phrase 
to this part of the analysis is “reasonably likely to occur.”  While no specific 
percentage is given, it is a less demanding standard than “more likely than 
not.”132  Thus, this part of the test sets a low bar for disclosure; if a trend is 
reasonably likely to occur, it must be disclosed. 
The second part of the test provides a contingency plan for when 
management is unable to make the determination that the trend is not 
reasonably likely to occur.133  If management cannot make such 
determination, it must assume that the trend will occur and objectively 
evaluate its consequences.134  Management must disclose this trend unless 
it “determines that a material effect on the registrant’s financial condition or 
results of operations is not reasonably likely to occur.”135 
Despite this guidance from the SEC, the requirements under this section 
are flexible and complicated, leaving the company with a difficult task.136  
Item 303 disclosures are intended to provide investors with a unique view 
of the registrant.137  By providing investors with this perspective, it 
provides context that will assist in understanding where a company is 
headed and whether it would be a wise investment.138  The SEC long has 
viewed a narrative explaining the disclosed financial statements as crucial 
to investor analysis of how indicative past performance is of the future 
success of the company.139 
To ensure compliance, however, it is important to implement effective 
enforcement mechanisms.140  Although Item 303 does not explicitly 
provide for a private cause of action, the SEC has other means by which to 
compel compliance.141  For example, the SEC has the ability to enter cease 
 
 129. See 1989 SEC Letter, supra note 6. 
 130. For the remainder of this Note, these terms will collectively be referred to as “trend.” 
 131. See 1989 SEC Letter, supra note 6, at 22,430. 
 132. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 
6296, 6302 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (“To be ‘reasonably likely’ a 
material violation must be more than a mere possibility, but it need not be ‘more likely than 
not.’”). 
 133. See 1989 SEC Letter, supra note 6, at 22,430. 
 134. See id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Mark S. Croft, MD&A:  The Tightrope of Disclosure, 45 S.C. L. REV. 477, 478 
(1994). 
 137. See 1989 SEC Release, supra note 6, at 22,436 (“[T]he general purpose of the 
MD&A requirements [is] to give investors an opportunity to look at the registrant through 
the eyes of management by providing a historical and prospective analysis of the registrant’s 
financial condition and results of operations, with particular emphasis on the registrant’s 
prospects for the future.”). 
 138. See id. 
 139. See 1987 SEC Release, supra note 6, at 13,717. 
 140. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure:  A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1023, 1034 (2000) (noting the importance of enforcing prohibitions against fraud). 
 141. See Croft, supra note 136, at 498–99. 
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and desist orders against a company that files a deficient MD&A.142  Not 
only is this a way to enforce rules promulgated by the SEC, but it also 
provides another avenue for the SEC to provide guidance to companies on 
how to adhere to its regulations.143 
For example, the SEC’s In re Caterpillar144 called upon the company to 
cease and desist from any action that resulted in a violation of the MD&A 
requirements.145  In addition, the company was required to “implement and 
maintain procedures designed to ensure compliance with Item 303.”146  The 
SEC found the company’s procedures to be inadequate, despite the fact that 
the MD&A in dispute was reviewed by several of the company’s officers, 
including the treasurer, legal counsel, and accounting department.147 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:  WHETHER VIOLATIONS OF ITEM 303 
MAY SERVE AS A BASIS FOR LIABILITY UNDER RULE 10b-5 
Part II of this Note examines the question of whether failure to comply 
with a disclosure requirement created by Item 303 can provide a basis for 
liability under Rule 10b-5.  Part II.A discusses three cases, a Third Circuit 
decision and two Second Circuit decisions, analyzed by the Ninth Circuit 
and the Second Circuit in reaching their conflicting conclusions.  Part II.B 
thoroughly examines a subsequent Ninth Circuit case, where the court 
considered whether violating Item 303 may serve as a basis for liability 
under Rule 10b-5.  Then, Part II.C discusses the Second Circuit’s analysis 
of the same question, including its critique of the Ninth Circuit’s approach.  
Finally, Part II.D briefly summarizes the competing arguments articulated 
in this circuit split. 
A.  Paving the Road for the Rulings:  
Qualification and Analogy 
This section discusses the three main cases examined by both the Ninth 
Circuit and the Second Circuit in reaching their conflicting conclusions. 
1.  Oran v. Stafford:  Leaving the Door Ajar 
In Oran v. Stafford,148 the plaintiff stockholders alleged that American 
Home Products Corporation (AHP) “made material misrepresentations and 
omissions” concerning the safety of the prescription drugs that they 
 
 142. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-30532, 50 S.E.C. 903 (Mar. 
31, 1992).  This was the first time the SEC used its new powers to require companies to 
cease and desist from actions that constituted violations of certain regulations. See Croft, 
supra note 136, at 504. 
 143. See Caterpillar, 50 S.E.C. at 912 (noting specific reasons why the MD&A in 
question was deficient). 
 144. Exchange Act Release No. 34-30532, 50 S.E.C. 903 (Mar. 31, 1992). 
 145. See id. at 913. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. at 907. 
 148. 226 F.3d 275 (3rd Cir. 2000).  Then-Judge Samuel A. Alito authored the majority 
opinion for the Third Circuit. 
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manufactured.149  Consequently, the plaintiffs claimed that they 
experienced a significant financial loss when AHP’s stock price dropped 
following the disclosure of this previously withheld information.150 
After the district court dismissed the complaint, the plaintiffs appealed 
and argued, among other things, that AHP violated Item 303, and such 
violation served as a basis for liability under section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.151  The Third Circuit held that in order for the plaintiffs to succeed, 
they had to establish that Item 303 “creates an independent private right of 
action, or that the regulation imposes an affirmative duty of disclosure on 
AHP that, if violated, would constitute a material omission under Rule 
10b-5.”152 
After explicitly holding that Item 303 does not create an independent 
private cause of action, the Third Circuit analyzed whether Item 303 creates 
an affirmative duty to disclose material information.153  In evaluating this 
argument, it examined whether Item 303 disclosure is regulated in a manner 
consistent with the standards imposed by the Supreme Court for private 
fraud actions.154  Finding that the materiality standards for Rule 10b-5 
“differ significantly” from those for Item 303,155 the Third Circuit stated:  
“[D]emonstration of a violation of the disclosure requirements of Item 303 
does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that such disclosure would be 
required under Rule 10b-5.  Such a duty to disclose must be separately 
shown.”156 
Thus, Oran held “that a violation of [Item 303’s] reporting requirements 
does not automatically give rise to a material omission under Rule 10b-5.  
Because plaintiffs have failed to plead any actionable misrepresentation or 
omission under that Rule, [Item 303] cannot provide a basis for liability.”157  
Both the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit would subsequently rely on this 
case, and particularly this phrase, to justify their conflicting conclusions.158 
2.  Litwin v. Blackstone Group, L.P. 
In Litwin v. Blackstone Group, L.P.,159 the Second Circuit analyzed 
whether violations of Item 303 may serve as a basis for liability under 
 
 149. Id. at 279.  The plaintiffs claimed that AHP failed to disclose that there were several 
studies that linked these drugs, Pondimin and Redux, to heart-valve damage. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. at 281. 
 152. Id. at 287. 
 153. See id. at 287–88. 
 154. The Third Circuit compared the SEC’s interpretation of the disclosure obligations 
created by Item 303 with the general securities fraud materiality standard established by the 
Supreme Court in Basic. See id. 
 155. According to the SEC, “the probability/magnitude test for materiality approved by 
the Supreme Court in Basic . . . is inapposite to Item 303 disclosure.” See 1989 SEC Release, 
supra note 6, at 22,430 n.27. 
 156. Oran, 226 F.3d at 288 (quoting Alfus v. Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 608 
(N.D. Cal. 1991)). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 159. 634 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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sections 11 and 12(a)(2).  Although the Ninth Circuit ultimately agreed with 
the Second Circuit on the outcome of Litwin, the courts disagreed over 
whether the analysis therein was applicable to understanding the connection 
between Item 303 and Rule 10b-5. 
In this case, the plaintiffs160 alleged that the defendants161 violated 
sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act by both omitting and affirmatively 
misstating material information in the company’s initial public offering 
registration statement and prospectus.162  Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that 
the defendants were aware of, and failed to disclose, problems relating to 
certain portfolio companies and investments that the company should have 
reasonably expected to have material effects on its future revenues.163  
Plaintiffs contended that because the defendants were obligated to disclose 
this information under Item 303, failure to do so provided the basis for 
liability.164 
The Second Circuit noted that, to promote compliance with disclosure 
obligations, section 11 places a low burden on the plaintiff.165  The focus 
then shifted to the legal standard for materiality, which is stated to be the 
same as that for Rule 10b-5 claims.166  After citing the standard for 
materiality laid out in Basic,167 the court reaffirmed its rejection of a 
formulaic approach to materiality analysis.168  It also noted that this 
analysis is a fact-based inquiry that must include assessment of both 
qualitative and quantitative factors.169 
In analyzing the materiality of the defendants’ alleged omissions and 
misstatements, the Second Circuit focused on several factors.  First, 
although the fact that information is publicly available is relevant, it is not 
dispositive.170  While certain events pertaining to the defendants’ company 
were publicly known, the potential impact of those events on the future of 
the company was not.171  Second, the court rejected the defendants’ use of a 
balancing test to avoid disclosure of material events that have negative 
 
 160. The plaintiffs in this class action were all individuals who purchased shares of the 
defendant corporation at the time of its initial public offering. See id. at 708. 
 161. The defendants were Blackstone Group, L.P. and several of its executives. Id. at 
708–09. 
 162. Id. at 708. 
 163. Id. at 710. 
 164. Id. at 716. 
 165. Id. (quoting Herman & Mac-Lean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1983)). 
 166. Id. at 717 n.10. 
 167. See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988). 
 168. Litwin, 634 F.3d at 717. 
 169. Id. (citing SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 
1999)).  With respect to quantitative factors, the SEC suggested using a 5 percent deviation 
as a benchmark.  Any disclosure that deviated from the actual value by less than 5 percent 
most likely would not be material.  However, this may not be the case if the disclosure 
concerned was qualitatively significant. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 
at 45,152. 
 170. Litwin, 634 F.3d at 718. 
 171. Id. at 718–19. 
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effects.172  With regard to the qualitative analysis, the Second Circuit 
considered whether the misstatement or omission was related to a 
significant part of the company’s business.173 
Third, the Second Circuit addressed the defendants’ concern that a broad 
interpretation of materiality would result in investors being buried with 
information, sacrificing quality for quantity.174  Conceding that the SEC 
prohibits this influx of information, the court pointed to certain protections 
that quelled this concern.175  Specifically, for omissions to serve as a basis 
for liability under sections 11 and 12(a)(2), the omitted information must be 
material and the company must have a duty to disclose.176  Thus, the court 
held that the combination of these requirements provides sufficient 
protection from the threat of overdisclosure. 
3.  Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Communications, Inc. 
In Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Communications, Inc.,177 the Second 
Circuit again analyzed whether violations of Item 303 may serve as a basis 
for liability under sections 11 and 12(a)(2).178  Specifically, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendant179 failed to disclose a known defect in a major 
product in both its registration statement and the prospectus for its 
secondary offering.180  Despite knowing the large scale of the defect, the 
defendant chose not to disclose particulars, but rather it issued a generic 
warning about the risks associated with selling complex products.181  Thus, 
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant violated Item 303 by failing to 
disclose this “known . . . uncertaint[y].”182 
In its analysis, the Second Circuit noted that omissions may serve as a 
basis for liability under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) if a company has an 
affirmative legal obligation to disclose.183  It then explicitly stated that the 
duty to disclose under Item 303 constituted such an obligation.184  The 
Second Circuit also explained that analysis of Item 303 violations was 
 
 172. Id. at 719.  The defendants tried to claim that the information in dispute was not 
material because the loss was offset by gains in other parts of the company.  The SEC also 
rejected this aggregation approach, concluding that each misstatement or omission should be 
considered independently. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. at 45,153. 
 173. Litwin, 634 F.3d at 720 (noting that the importance of the business segment being 
discussed is directly correlated to the likelihood that such disclosure is material). 
 174. Id. at 722. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 722–23. 
 177. 681 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 178. Id. at 116.  Although the plaintiffs also alleged violations of section 15 of the 1933 
Act, this Note does not discuss those allegations. 
 179. The defendant company produced semiconductors used by original equipment 
manufacturers in the communications industry. Id. 
 180. Id. at 116–17.  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant became aware of this defect 
after receiving complaints from two of its largest customers. Id. at 116. 
 181. Id. at 117.  Three months after the secondary offering, the defendant issued a recall 
of this defective product, which resulted in a $2.2 million net loss. Id. 
 182. Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2016)). 
 183. Id. at 120. 
 184. Id. 
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similar to a materiality analysis in that neither relies on “restrictive 
mechanical or quantitative inquiries.”185 
The Second Circuit relied on two critical factual allegations to vacate the 
district court’s denial of leave to amend.  First, the defective product was 
sold to customers representing 72 percent of the defendant’s revenues.186  
Second, the company would be unable to easily ascertain exactly which 
products contained the defects.187  Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that 
even though the precise magnitude of the harm was not known at the time 
the offering documents were released, it is plausible that the defendants 
were aware of an “uncertainty” that was “reasonably expected” to have a 
negative material impact on the company.188 
B.  The Ninth Circuit:  Closing the Door to Liability 
In the Ninth Circuit’s In re NVIDIA Corp. Securities Litigation,189 the 
court held that violating Item 303’s duty to disclose cannot provide a basis 
for liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.190  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on both case law and SEC 
statements.191 
Plaintiffs brought this case after the share price of NVIDIA 
Corporation192 dropped 31 percent, decreasing its market capitalization by 
$3 billion.193  This loss occurred after NVIDIA filed an 8-K in July 2008, 
disclosing that the company would need to take “a $150 to $200 million 
charge to cover warranty, repair, return, replacement, and other costs,” 
resulting from defects in certain MCP194 and GPU195 products.196 
According to the plaintiffs,197 however, NVIDIA knew about the defects 
in its products, and the potential for liability, several months before this 
disclosure.198  Plaintiffs further alleged that this information was material to 
investors and should have been disclosed.199  Because NVIDIA failed to do 
so, other statements contained in these filings were misleading in violation 
 
 185. Id. at 122. 
 186. See id. at 121. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See id. 
 189. 768 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 190. See id. at 1056. 
 191. See id. at 1054–56. 
 192. NVIDIA, a publicly traded company, produced semiconductors. Id. at 1048. 
 193. See id. at 1051. 
 194. MCPs are media and communications processors, which combine the functions of 
various devices, such as GPUs and audio signal processors. See id. at 1048. 
 195. GPUs are graphics processing units, which process the data required for rendering 
images on a computer. See id. 
 196. Id. at 1050. 
 197. The plaintiffs in this case consisted of a class of stockholders who purchased stock in 
NVIDIA during the class period:  November 8, 2007 through July 2, 2008. Id. at 1051. 
 198. See id. at 1048.  According to the complaint, NVIDIA began experiencing problems 
in September 2006. See id. at 1049.  At that time, NVIDIA began making changes to these 
products and working with some of its customers to determine the cause of the defects. See 
id. at 1049–50. 
 199. Id. at 1051. 
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of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.200  Specifically, the plaintiffs contended 
that because Item 303 creates a duty to disclose certain material 
information, failure to do so violates section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.201 
The court, noting that this was a matter of first impression in the Ninth 
Circuit, held that “Item 303’s disclosure duty is [not] actionable under 
[s]ection 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”202  In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth 
Circuit considered its own precedent203 and the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Oran.204  Focusing on the fact that the materiality standards for Rule 10b-5 
“differ significantly” from those for Item 303, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that this difference precluded Item 303 violations from serving as a basis 
for liability under Rule 10b-5.205 
In addition, the Ninth Circuit rejected the comparison of Rule 10b-5 to 
sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act.206  It noted that unlike 
Rule 10b-5, liability under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) arises from a failure to 
comply with an affirmative duty to disclose.207  Further, plaintiffs are not 
required to prove scienter in section 11 or section 12(a)(2) claims.208  Thus, 
the Ninth Circuit found NVIDIA distinguishable from Litwin and Panther 
Partners.209 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument based on 
Simon v. American Power Conversion Corp.210  In Simon, the District Court 
of Rhode Island noted that Item 303 does create a disclosure obligation and 
that the defendant’s failure to disclose created a basis for liability.211  The 
Ninth Circuit, however, pointed out that the District Court of Rhode Island 
later clarified Simon and held that a violation of Item 303, without more, 
does not establish that defendants violated Rule 10b-5.212 
 
 200. Id. at 1048, 1051.  The plaintiffs pointed to a number of filings to illustrate this 
claim, including an 8-K filed on February 13, 2008, which asserted:  “Fiscal 2008 was 
another outstanding and record year for us.  Strong demand for GPUs in all market segments 
drove our growth.” Id. at 1050. 
 201. Id. at 1054. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See id. (citing In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 870 (9th Cir. 1993)) (noting 
that because forecasts are addressed in a separate SEC regulation, such statements need not 
be disclosed under Item 303 and thus do not serve as a basis for liability under Rule 10b-5); 
In re Lyondell Petrochemical Co. Sec. Litig., 984 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(distinguishing between “known trends or uncertainties,” which must be disclosed under 
Item 303, and forecasts, which need not be disclosed under Item 303); In re Convergent 
Techs. Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 516 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that forecasts need not be 
disclosed under Item 303). 
 204. See NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1054–55; see also supra Part II.A.1. 
 205. See NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1055. 
 206. See id. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See id. at 1056. 
 209. See id. at 1055–56.  For a detailed discussion of these two cases, see supra Part 
II.A.2–3. 
 210. 945 F. Supp. 416 (D.R.I. 1996); see NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1056. 
 211. See Simon, 945 F. Supp. at 431. 
 212. See NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1056 (citing Kafenbaum v. GTECH Holdings Corp., 217 F. 
Supp. 2d 238, 250 (D.R.I. 2002)). 
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After considering these cases, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Item 303 
does not establish a duty to disclose that can create liability under section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.213  Creating liability under Rule 10b-5 requires that 
plaintiffs establish a separate duty to disclose.214  The Ninth Circuit also 
concluded that the plaintiffs failed to plead a strong inference of scienter 
and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the amended complaint.215 
C.  The Second Circuit:  Rejecting NVIDIA 
and Opening the Door to Liability 
In Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley,216 the Second Circuit held that 
violating the disclosure requirements established by Item 303 may serve as 
a basis for liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5).217  It qualified 
this holding, however, by noting that such a violation can create liability 
only “if the allegedly omitted information satisfies Basic’s test for 
materiality,” and the plaintiff satisfies all of the other requirements 
necessary to sustain a 10b-5 action.218 
In Stratte-McClure, the plaintiffs219 claimed that the defendants220 “made 
material misstatements and omissions between June 20, 2007 and 
November 19, 2007 (the class period) in an effort to conceal Morgan 
Stanley’s exposure to and losses from the subprime mortgage market.”221  
Consequently, the plaintiffs alleged that they “suffered substantial financial 
loss” when Morgan Stanley’s stock price dropped after the truth was 
publicly disclosed.222 
This case centered on a “massive proprietary trade” executed by the 
defendants in December 2006.223  In this trade, the defendants were 
essentially “betting that defaults in the subprime mortgage markets would 
be significant enough to impair the value of the higher-risk collateralized 
debt obligations (CDO) tranches referenced by the Short Position,[224] but 
not significant enough to impair the value of the lower-risk CDOs tranches 
referenced by the Long Position.”225 
 
 213. See id. 
 214. See id. at 1055. 
 215. See id. at 1048, 1062. 
 216. 776 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 217. See id. 
 218. Id. at 103. 
 219. The plaintiffs were a class of investors, led by State-Boston Retirement System and 
Fjarde AP-Fonden. Id. at 96. 
 220. The defendants were Morgan Stanley and six former and current officers. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 97. 
 224. In the “Short Position,” the credit default swaps (CDS), purchased by the defendant 
on CDOs backed by mezzanine tranches of subprime residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS), functioned like insurance policies.  In return for the payment of annual premiums, 
the defendant received payments if these RMBSs defaulted or declined in value as a result of 
a declining housing market. See id. 
 225. Id.  In the “Long Position,” the defendant sold CDSs that were similar to the ones 
purchased in the Short Position, but these CDSs were referenced by higher-rated, lower-risk 
CDOs.  Since the defendant was the seller in the Long Position, it received premiums in 
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Although the defendants accurately predicted that the subprime mortgage 
markets would decline, they underestimated the magnitude, which resulted 
in a loss of billions of dollars.226  The plaintiffs contended that the 
defendants made many material misstatements and omissions to conceal 
their “exposure to and losses from” this transaction during the class 
period.227 
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley made material 
omissions in its 10-Q filings by failing to disclose the losses sustained on 
the “Long Position” in 2007 and that it was likely to suffer additional 
substantial losses in the future.228  Consequently, the plaintiffs claimed, the 
defendants violated the Item 303 obligation to disclose “known trends, or 
uncertainties that have had, or might reasonably be expected to have, 
a[n] . . . unfavorable material effect.”229 
Noting that this was a matter of first impression in the Second Circuit, 
the court concluded that an Item 303 violation may be actionable under 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but only if the violation satisfies the 
materiality standards established by Basic and all of the other requirements 
necessary to sustain such action.230  In reaching this conclusion, it relied on 
precedent, other sections of the 1933 Act, and scholarly commentary. 
The Second Circuit noted that it consistently had held that an omission is 
actionable only when there is a duty to disclose the omitted information.231  
This duty to disclose may be created by insider trading violations, a statute 
or regulation, or a statement that would be “inaccurate, incomplete, or 
misleading” without additional disclosure.232  Agreeing with the plaintiffs, 
the court found that Item 303 imposes an obligation to disclose “any known 
trends or uncertainties . . . that the registrant reasonably expects will have a 
material . . . unfavorable impact on . . . revenues or income from continuing 
operations.”233 
After concluding that Item 303 creates an affirmative duty to disclose, the 
Second Circuit noted that courts have historically recognized that Rule 
10b-5 violations can be “derive[d] from statutes or regulations that obligate 
a party to speak.”234  Because Item 303 requires these disclosures, an 
investor could reasonably interpret silence as an implication that there are 
 
exchange for the promise that it would distribute payments if these higher-rated CDOs 
defaulted or declined in value. See id. 
 226. See id. 
 227. Id. at 98.  There were two categories of misrepresentations and omissions:  those 
regarding the defendant’s exposure to credit risk arising from the Long Position (“the 
exposure claim”) and those regarding the losses from the Long Position (“the valuation 
claim”). Id. 
 228. See id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See id. at 107–08. 
 231. See id. at 101.  These holdings were the result of the Supreme Court’s conclusion 
that if there is no duty to disclose, silence is not misleading under Rule 10b-5. See id. at 100–
01 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988)). 
 232. Id. at 101 (quoting Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 233. Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2016)). 
 234. Id. at 102. 
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no “known trends or uncertainties . . . that the registrant reasonably expects 
will have a material . . . unfavorable impact on . . . revenues or income from 
continuing operations.”235  Thus, if such trends or uncertainties do exist, 
silence may be misleading to investors.236 
Although the Second Circuit acknowledged that Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 
have different materiality standards, it did not find these differences 
significant enough to automatically preclude liability.237  Instead, it held 
that, although Item 303 violations establish that a defendant has a duty to 
disclose, a plaintiff must also establish that the omission was material under 
Basic to be successful.238 
The Second Circuit also compared Stratte-McClure to Litwin and 
Panther Partners, where it held Item 303 violations to be actionable under 
section 11 and section 12(a)(2).239  Noting the similarity in the language of 
section 12(a)(2) and Rule 10b-5,240 it held that in both contexts, omitting 
information required by Item 303 may mislead investors.241  Thus, because  
Item 303 may create a duty to disclose under section 12(a)(2), the same is 
true for claims brought under Rule 10b-5.242 
Although the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs successfully had 
alleged that the defendant violated the duty to disclose created by Item 
303,243 it affirmed the dismissal of the claim because the plaintiffs failed to 
adequately plead scienter.244 
The Second Circuit also explicitly noted its disagreement with the Ninth 
Circuit.245  Specifically, the Second Circuit found that the Ninth Circuit had 
misinterpreted Oran and refuted the notion that Oran conclusively 
established that violations of Item 303 are never actionable under Rule 
10b-5.246  Instead, the Second Circuit found that Oran actually opened the 
door to the possibility that such liability could be created in certain 
situations.247  Noting that, at the very least, Oran is consistent with the 
holding that Item 303 violations can establish liability under Rule 10b-5 if 
 
 235. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii). 
 236. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102. 
 237. See id. at 103. 
 238. See id. 
 239. See generally Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 
2012); Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2011).  For a discussion of 
these cases see supra Part II.A.2–3. 
 240. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5) (“Like 
[s]ection 12(a)(2), Rule 10b-5 requires disclosure of ‘material fact[s] necessary in order to 
make . . . statements made . . . not misleading . . . .’”). 
 241. See id. at 104. 
 242. See id. 
 243. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that it satisfied its Item 303 obligations, 
finding that its “disclosures about market trends were generic, spread out over several 
different filings, and often unconnected to the company’s financial position.” Id. at 105. 
 244. See id. at 106. 
 245. See id. at 103. 
 246. See id. 
 247. See id. (quoting Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
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the other elements of Rule 10b-5 have been established and the omission 
meets the Basic standard for materiality.248 
In addition, the Second Circuit found that in NVIDIA, the Ninth Circuit 
“misconstrue[d] the relationship between Rule 10b-5 and [s]ection 
12(a)(2).”249  Although the Ninth Circuit previously followed the decision 
in Panther Partners, it failed to note that both Rule 10b-5 and section 
12(a)(2) have “textually identical” prohibitions on omissions.250  Thus, both 
Panther Partners and Litwin are relevant to this issue and “provide firm 
footing” for the Second Circuit’s conclusion.251 
D.  Summary of the Circuit Split 
As noted in Stratte-McClure, the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit 
are “at odds” regarding whether a violation of Item 303 is actionable under 
Rule 10b-5.252  While both courts used Oran to support their conflicting 
conclusions, they disagreed over the repercussions of the Third Circuit’s 
determination that, due to the differing materiality standards of Item 303 
and Rule 10b-5, a violation of Item 303 “does not automatically give rise to 
a material omission under Rule 10b-5.”253  The Ninth Circuit found that this 
statement supported an absolute bar to liability, while the Second Circuit 
held that this language allowed for the possibility of liability in certain 
situations.254 
In addition, the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit disagreed over 
whether it was appropriate to analogize to cases brought under sections 11 
and 12(a)(2).  In Litwin and Panther Partners, the Second Circuit 
“established that Item 303 creates a duty to disclose for the purposes of 
liability under [s]ection 12(a)(2).”255  Relying on the fact that both section 
12(a)(2) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit omissions of material facts necessary to 
make other statements not misleading, the Second Circuit found that Item 
303 also could establish a duty to disclose for purposes of Rule 10b-5.256  
The Ninth Circuit, however, despite adopting the conclusions of Litwin and 
Panther Partners,257 found those decisions to be “irrelevant to its analysis 
of Rule 10b-5.”258 
Finally, it is worth noting that, despite these different conclusions, both 
cases were dismissed, at least in part, because the plaintiffs failed to 
adequately plead scienter.259 
 
 248. See id. at 103–04. 
 249. Id. at 104. 
 250. See id. 
 251. See id. 
 252. Id. at 103. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See id. at 103–04. 
 255. Id. at 104. 
 256. See id. 
 257. See Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 258. Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 104. 
 259. See id. at 106; In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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III.  THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD 
ADOPT STRATTE-MCCLURE 
Part III of this Note argues that the Supreme Court should examine this 
issue and adopt the Second Circuit’s conclusion that violations of Item 303 
may create liability under Rule 10b-5, but only in instances where the other 
elements of Rule 10b-5 have been satisfied and the omission or 
misstatement meets the Basic standard for materiality.  Part III.A discusses 
the relationship between the materiality standards for Item 303 and Rule 
10b-5.  Part III.B presents and resolves several hypotheticals addressing the 
different potential outcomes of Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 analyses.  Part 
III.C discusses three cases underlying the Second Circuit’s analysis.  Next, 
Part III.D explains how the remedies for Item 303 violations and Rule 
10b-5 claims support this conclusion.  Finally, Part III.E describes how the 
Second Circuit’s conclusion will impact various participants in the 
securities markets. 
A.  Materiality:  The Connection Between 
Separate Standards and Related Roles 
In rejecting the notion that Item 303 could provide a basis for liability 
under 10b-5, the Ninth Circuit focused on the differing materiality 
requirements.260  While the SEC did explicitly state that the Basic 
materiality test was “inapposite to Item 303 disclosure,”261 that assertion 
does not necessarily mean that there is no overlap between the two 
standards.262  In certain instances, as illustrated by the scenarios below, 
information may satisfy both Item 303’s and Rule 10b-5’s materiality 
standards.263 
Looking at both parts of the Item 303 materiality test promulgated by the 
SEC,264 it becomes evident that probability is the driving factor.265  Even 
though the second part of this test calls upon management to assume that a 
trend will happen, the exception, which eliminates the obligation to 
disclose, also is based on a probability analysis.266  Regardless of the 
magnitude of the potential material effect on the registrant’s finances or 
operations, if that effect is not reasonably likely to occur, it need not be 
disclosed under Item 303.267  The Rule 10b-5 materiality standard, 
however, incorporates both probability and magnitude.268  Under this test, 
even an event that is not reasonably likely to occur might need to be 
disclosed if its potential impact on the company is extreme. 
 
 260. NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1055. 
 261. 1989 SEC Release, supra note 6, at 22,430 n.27. 
 262. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103. 
 263. See infra Part III.B. 
 264. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 265. See generally 1989 SEC Letter, supra note 6. 
 266. See id. 
 267. See id. 
 268. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur 
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
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While this discrepancy supports the conclusion that an Item 303 violation 
does not inevitably provide a basis for liability under Rule 10b-5, it does 
not justify a complete bar against such liability.269  A proper analysis of the 
relationship between Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 should include two steps.  
First, courts should analyze whether Item 303 creates a duty to disclose the 
information in question.270  Then, courts should conduct a separate analysis 
to see if the information satisfies the materiality standard set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Basic.271  In situations where the information has a high 
probability of occurring, failure to disclose will violate Item 303 and 
simultaneously satisfy Rule 10b-5’s materiality requirement. 
B.  Hypotheticals:  Relationship Between 
Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 
On closer consideration, it becomes evident that there are four distinct 
possibilities when considering the relationship between Item 303 and Rule 
10b-5:  Item 303 violation only; Rule 10b-5 violation only; Item 303 and 
Rule 10b-5 violation; and no violation.272  This section will use 
hypotheticals to discuss the first three possibilities.  In each of these 
hypotheticals, a company is deciding whether it should disclose the 
occurrence of a particular event, considering whether an omission of this 
information would violate Item 303, Rule 10b-5, or both. 
In scenario one, assume that a new regulation is proposed that, if 
adopted, will require the company to completely redesign its product.  
Assuming this event is not reasonably likely to occur, the two tests will 
produce conflicting results.  Under Item 303, no disclosure is necessary 
because this event is not reasonably likely to occur.273  Under Rule 10b-5, 
however, because the magnitude of the impact of the event is so great, 
disclosure is required, even if the event has a low probability of coming to 
fruition.274 
In scenario two, assume that a new regulation is proposed that, if 
adopted, will compel the company to purchase additional safety equipment 
for its workers.  Assume that the probability of this event occurring is 20 
percent, but that the consequences will not be significant in magnitude.  
Under these circumstances, because the event is reasonably likely to occur, 
it must be disclosed under Item 303.275  Rule 10b-5, however, will not 
require disclosure because of the combination of low probability and low 
magnitude.276 
In scenario three, assume that a new regulation is proposed that, if 
adopted, will cause the company to recall the majority of the products it 
 
 269. See supra Part II.A.1, II.C. 
 270. See supra Part II.A.2–3; see also Crawford & Galaro, supra note 10. 
 271. See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 272. See supra Part I.C. 
 273. See supra Part I.C. 
 274. See supra Part I.C. 
 275. See supra Part I.C. 
 276. See supra Part I.C. 
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sold in the past year.  Assume that adoption of this regulation is reasonably 
likely to occur.  In this situation, a company would be required to disclose 
under both Item 303 and Rule 10b-5.277  It is this scenario that demonstrates 
that, while not inevitable, a violation of Item 303 may serve as a basis for 
liability under 10b-5.278 
In scenario three, however, it is important to recognize that two separate 
analyses are being conducted and that each violation plays a distinct role in 
the 10b-5 analysis.  The Item 303 violation does not speak to the materiality 
requirement of a 10b-5 claim, but rather to the question of whether the 
registrant had a duty to disclose.279  Plaintiffs also must establish that the 
omitted information, which was alleged to constitute the Item 303 violation, 
satisfies the materiality standard established under Basic.280  To be 
successful, any plaintiff additionally must prove the remaining elements 
required for a 10b-5 claim.281 
C.  Cases:  Oran, Panthers Partners, and Litwin 
Although both the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit relied on the 
same three cases when analyzing whether Item 303 violations are actionable 
under Rule 10b-5, they did so in different ways. This section will illustrate 
why the Second Circuit’s analysis of each case should be accepted, 
supporting the conclusion that such violations are actionable. 
First, the Second Circuit correctly concluded that Oran left open the 
possibility that a violation of Item 303 may produce liability under Rule 
10b-5.282  Although the Oran Court did comment on the diverging 
materiality standards of these two regulations, it did not foreclose the 
possibility that there may be instances when the two overlap.283  Instead of 
bifurcating its analysis, the Ninth Circuit combined the question of whether 
there is a duty to disclose with the question of whether the information was 
material.284 
Although this Note concludes that the Second Circuit’s interpretation of 
Oran is more accurate, it is also important to consider whether Oran itself 
was decided correctly.  After analyzing the relationship between the 
materiality standards of Item 303 and Rule 10b-5, it becomes clear that, 
although not inevitable, there are situations in which a company’s omission 
may constitute a violation of Item 303 and simultaneously satisfy the 
materiality requirement of Rule 10b-5.285  Thus, this Note concludes that 
 
 277. See supra Part I.C. 
 278. See supra Parts I.C, II.C. 
 279. See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 280. See id. 
 281. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 282. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103–04. 
 283. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000)  (noting that Item 303 
violations do not “inevitably” or “automatically” constitute a material omission under Rule 
10b-5). 
 284. See In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 285. See supra Part III.B. 
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Oran accurately articulates the relationship between Item 303 and Rule 
10b-5. 
This Note also advocates for the Second Circuit’s conclusion that Litwin 
and Panther Partners are relevant to this issue.  Although sections 11 and 
12(a)(2) impose a lower burden on plaintiffs than Rule 10b-5, the test for 
materiality is the same for all three causes of action.286  Thus, the 
materiality standard applied to sections 11 and 12(a)(2) is distinct from 
materiality for purposes of Item 303.287  Despite these diverging materiality 
standards, in Panther Partners, the Second Circuit explicitly found that 
Item 303 creates a duty to disclose that may serve as a basis for section 11 
and 12(a)(2) claims.288  This bifurcated analysis allows courts to give 
proper consideration to each materiality standard without unnecessarily 
closing the door to certain forms of liability.289 
The fact that several elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim, including scienter, 
are not required to bring a successful claim under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) 
does not render claims brought under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) irrelevant to 
those brought under Rule 10b-5.290  In all three claims, a material omission 
may serve as a basis for liability if the party had a legal obligation to 
disclose that information.291  It is important to note, however, that this 
conclusion does not reduce the importance of the other elements required to 
bring a successful claim under Rule 10b-5.292  As illustrated by NVIDIA 
and Stratte-McClure, courts may disagree over the impact of an Item 303 
violation and yet agree that plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead a 
claim under Rule 10b-5.293  Thus, this analogy is appropriate to the limited 
extent of illustrating the relationship between Item 303 violations and the 
materiality standard established by the Supreme Court in Basic.294 
D.  The Role of Remedies 
Following the conclusion reached by the Ninth Circuit would limit 
enforcement of Item 303 violations.295  Although Stratte-McClure does not 
go so far as to create a private right of action for Item 303 violations, by 
connecting them to Rule 10b-5 claims, it changes the spectrum of remedies 
 
 286. See Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706, 717 n.10 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 287. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103–04. 
 288. See Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
 289. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 104 (noting that Item 303 violations can mislead 
investors and thus violate Rule 10b-5). 
 290. See id. at 102. 
 291. See id. (“This Court and our sister circuits have long recognized that a duty to 
disclose under [s]ection 10(b) can derive from statutes or regulations that obligate a party to 
speak.”).  The Second Circuit also noted that this decision is supported by an SEC cease-
and-desist order, which held that omissions that violate Item 303 constituted violations of 
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See id. at 102 n.5. 
 292. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 293. See supra Part II.D. 
 294. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 104. 
 295. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-30532, 50 S.E.C. 903 (Mar. 
31, 1992). 
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available to those harmed by such violations.296  Because one of the 
remedies awarded for successful Rule 10b-5 claims is damages, allowing 
violations of Item 303 to serve as a basis for Rule 10b-5 liability will 
provide a much greater incentive for companies to comply with Item 303 
regulations.297 
This is a desired result because of the intrinsic value Item 303 disclosure 
provides to investors.298  The explanatory narrative of the required financial 
statements is particularly helpful for evaluating “the likelihood that past 
performance is indicative of future performance.”299  Although the SEC has 
used its enforcement mechanisms to encourage compliance with Item 303 
obligations, expanding liability to include the possibility of having to pay 
damages provides an even stronger incentive to comply.300  While adopting 
the holding of Stratte-McClure will most likely increase the number of 
cases brought, the other elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim will help protect 
against an influx of unnecessary litigation.301 
One counterargument, however, is that the creation of this liability may 
cause companies to respond by disclosing too much information.302  The 
requirements of Item 303, however, provide some intrinsic safeguards to 
protect against this risk.  First, because Item 303 requires issuers to disclose 
negative trends and uncertainties, companies will not seek to provide more 
information than necessary.303  Further, Item 303 is limited in scope.  For 
example, MD&A disclosure is limited to “known trends” or 
“uncertainties.”304  It is unlikely that companies will expend resources to 
gather additional information simply to inundate the investor with such 
data.305 
E.  The Broader Impact 
From the inception of a regulatory scheme centered on mandatory 
disclosure, tension between the needs of the various participants in the 
securities markets has spurred continuous calls for reform.306  While it will 
not resolve all of these disputes, concluding that Item 303 may serve as a 
basis for liability under Rule 10b-5 assists in creating a regulatory regime 
that fosters the production of useful information.  This section discusses the 
 
 296. See supra Part I.C.1. 
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impact of such liability on companies, sophisticated investors, and 
unsophisticated investors. 
Although such liability imposes a stronger burden on companies to 
provide sufficient disclosure under Item 303, this burden does not 
necessarily impose exorbitant costs.  First, because Item 303 is meant to 
provide an insight into the manager’s perspective of the company,307 it is 
unlikely that such disclosure will require the company to expend additional 
resources on research.  On the other hand, the company may be forced to 
incur costs such as time, particularly the time of its management.  This cost, 
however, may simultaneously be a benefit to the company.  Spending more 
time preparing the MD&A may result in management having a better 
understanding of the company and being better equipped to plan for its 
future.  This proposition also refutes the argument that additional disclosure 
requirements will disadvantage smaller companies.308 
In addition, concluding that Item 303 is actionable under Rule 10b-5 will 
alleviate a company’s fear that other companies will be able to unfairly 
exploit disclosed information.309  Because such disclosure is required of all 
companies, each company can disclose information without the fear of 
being unfairly disadvantaged.310  Further, as explicitly noted by the Second 
Circuit, the SEC does not require companies to disclose “internal business 
strategies or to identify the particulars of its trading positions.”311 
This proposed resolution also provides benefits to both sophisticated and 
unsophisticated investors.  More thorough Item 303 disclosures reduce 
expenses that sophisticated investors need to spend on gathering and 
verifying such information.312  While these investors are less dependent on 
the MD&A to understand disclosed financial information, such disclosure 
still may assist them in understanding the trajectory of the company.313 
Ensuring that companies comply with Item 303 is especially useful for 
unsophisticated investors, who may not be as equipped as sophisticated 
investors to discern the implications of the vast amount of financial data 
disclosed by companies.  While unsophisticated investors benefit from 
prices that reflect publicly disclosed information, these prices do not always 
accurately describe the risks associated with particular investments.314  Not 
only does the resolution presented in Stratte-McClure encourage companies 
to pay closer attention to Item 303 disclosures, but it also provides an 
avenue for relief for those investors who truly were harmed by misleading 
information. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the debate surrounding mandatory disclosure began at the 
inception of securities regulations, the circuit split concerning whether 
violations of Item 303 may serve as a basis for liability under Rule 10b-5 
has only recently been brought to light.  Soon after the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that Item 303 violations are not actionable under Rule 10b-5, the 
Second Circuit explicitly rejected that holding.  Disagreeing with multiple 
aspects of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, the Second Circuit held that Item 
303 violations can serve as a basis for liability under Rule 10b-5.  Noting 
that this was a matter of first impression, the Second Circuit also qualified 
this conclusion so that such liability may only be found if plaintiffs satisfy 
all other requirements of a Rule 10b-5 claim, including the materiality 
requirements set forth in Basic. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Note concludes that the Second 
Circuit’s holding in Stratte-McClure should be accepted.  The fact that 
materiality standards for Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 are different does not 
preclude information from simultaneously meeting both standards. In 
addition, the importance of Item 303, and the unique insight it provides into 
the status of a company, support a resolution that encourages accurate and 
sufficient Item 303 disclosure.  Thus, the Supreme Court should resolve this 
dispute by holding that, in certain situations, violations of Item 303 may 
result in successful Rule 10b-5 claims. 
